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Abstract: In this paper we formulate and test a number of hypotheses regarding insurer participation and volume
decisions in derivatives markets. Several specific hypotheses are supported by our analysis. We find evidence
consistent with the idea that insurers are motivated to use financial derivatives to hedge the costs of financial
distress, interest rate, liquidity, and exchange rate risks. We also find some evidence that insurers use these
instruments to hedge embedded options and manage their tax bills. We also find evidence of significant
economies of scale in the use of derivatives. Interestingly, we often find that the predetermined variables we
employ display opposite signs in the participation and volume regressions. We argue that this result is broadly
consistent with the hypothesis that there is also a per unit premium associated with hedging and that, conditional
on having risk exposures large enough to warrant participation, firms with a larger appetite for risk will be less
willing than average to pay this marginal cost.
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This paper examines factors that influence the use of financial derivatives in the U.S. insurance
industry.  We investigate rationales that might explain both the decision to use derivatives as well as the
volume of these transactions. The principal objective is to empirically investigate the general motivations
for corporate risk management as well as several more specific hypotheses relating to the insurance
industry.  In our empirical analysis, we take advantage of the disclosure requirements imposed on
insurers by state regulators that provide detailed information on individual holdings and transactions in
derivatives markets.
The use of derivatives in corporate risk management has grown rapidly in recent years, fueled
in part by the success of the financial industry in creating a variety of over-the-counter and exchange-
traded  products.  A 1995 survey of major non-financial firms revealed that at least 70 percent are using
some form of financial engineering to manage interest rate, foreign exchange, or commodity price risk
(Wharton-Chase, 1995).  Financial firms, including banks (see, for example, Gunther and Siems, 1995,
and Shanker, 1996), savings and loans (Brewer, et al., 1996), and insurers (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1995,
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 1997), also are active in derivatives markets.  Although the types of risks
confronting managers vary somewhat across industries, there is substantial commonality in the
underlying rationale for the use of derivatives and the financial engineering techniques that are employed.
At first glance, modern finance theory provides little motivation for hedging by widely held
corporations.  According to theory, shares of such corporations are held by diversified investors who,
operating in frictionless and complete markets, eliminate non-systematic risk through their portfolio
choices.  In this context, risk management at the firm level is a dead-weight cost that destroys
shareholder value.  Although valuable as a starting point, this frictionless theory of finance has given way
in recent years to a richer set of hypotheses whereby various market imperfections, incentive conflicts,1For more extensive discussions of the rationale for corporate risk management, see Smith
and Stulz (1985), Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Stulz (1996), and Tufano (1996).
2See Smith and Stulz (1985), Stulz (1996), and Tufano (1996).
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and information asymmetries create motivations for even value maximizing corporate managers to alter
the risk/return profile of the firm.
1  Alternatively, managerial risk aversion, incentive conflicts between
managers and owners, and related factors may also lead to a demand for risk management activities that
conflict with value maximization.
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In the first category, firms, faced with costly frictions, are hypothesized to manage risks to the
benefit of shareholders.  Examples of these frictions include bankruptcy and bankruptcy related costs,
such as legal and court costs.  More generally, firms that encounter financial difficulty can experience
increased costs of borrowing and reputational loss that can affect relationships with employees, suppliers,
and customers.  Other examples would include firms whose cash flows are adversely affected by
contingencies that, left unhedged, may force managers to forego profitable investment projects for lack
of affordable capital.  The convexity of the corporate income tax schedule provides another potentially
value-increasing motivation for corporate hedging.  
Hedging that arises from managerial risk aversion, on the other hand, is likely to reduce firm
value.  Managers may behave in a risk averse manner, taking less risk than would be optimal for the
firm’s owners, because their human capital and wealth are poorly diversified.  Such lack of diversification
can result from managers having, for example, firm-specific human capital that results in a relatively large
proportion of the firm’s stock being held by managers.  These factors are especially likely to have an
adverse effect if managerial compensation arrangements are poorly designed.  Another managerial
motivation for hedging involves the use of risk management to signal managerial skill in the presence of
asymmetric information (Breedon and Viswanathan, 1996, DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995).  3
Prior research suggests that the factors motivating corporations in general to manage risk are also
important in the insurance industry (Cummins and Lamm-Tennant, 1993, Babbel and Santomero, 1997).
As financial intermediaries with relatively long-term assets and liabilities, life insurers are subject to
significant interest rate risk.  They are also subject to liquidity risk due to their heavy investment in
illiquid privately placed securities and real estate investments (including mortgages) as well as the
embedded options in many insurance policies that permit buyers to withdraw funds in response to
interest rate changes and other economic fluctuations.  Default risk also has the potential to affect life
insurer cash flows.  While property liability insurers face some of the same risks as life insurers, they are
also subject to extremely volatile cash outflows due to liability lawsuits and property catastrophes such
as hurricanes and earthquakes.  Both types of insurers face exchange rate risk due to the increasing
internationalization of insurance and financial markets.  Regulatory intervention, including recently
introduced risk based capital requirements, may also provide a motivation for risk management (see
Cummins, Harrington, and Niehaus, 1994). 
As noted earlier, managerial risk aversion and incentive issues may also be important practical
rationales for risk management in the insurance industry.  A substantial proportion of the firms in the
industry are closely held stocks and mutual companies, where managers are likely to exhibit risk aversion
because of suboptimal diversification of personal wealth, organization specific capital, and/or the absence
of effective mechanisms for owners to use as disciplining devices.
In this paper, we develop a set of hypotheses regarding the hedging behavior of insurers, specify
variables to represent the hypotheses, and then perform tests on a sample of life and property-liability
insurers. The sample consists of all U.S. life and property-liability insurers reporting to the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  The data on derivatives positions are taken from
Schedule DB of the 1994 annual regulatory statements filed by insurers with state regulators.  We4
investigate both the decision to conduct derivatives transactions and the volume of transactions
undertaken by firms who enter derivatives markets. Unlike many earlier studies, our data allow us to
identify virtually all derivatives transactions across instruments.  This, in turn, allows us to observe the
portfolio of derivative securities; presumably, the relevant choice variable for optimization purposes.
However, we clearly build on earlier theory and econometric techniques that have provided evidence on
the determinants of derivative participation by nonfinancial firms (Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993,
Fenn, Post and Sharpe, 1996, and Tufano, 1996), banks (Sinkey and Carter, 1995, Gunther and Siems,
1995), and insurers (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1995, and Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 1997).
In this paper, we extend work in the insurance area by explicitly specifying hypotheses about the
demand for hedging by insurers, defining a number of new variables to test these hypotheses, and
devoting more attention to testing hypotheses related to cross-sectional variation in the volume of
derivatives transactions as well as analyzing the participation decision.  In particular, we extend the work
of Colquitt and Hoyt (CH) (1995) in a number of dimensions.  Whereas CH base their analysis on life
insurers licensed in Georgia, our sample includes the universe of insurers reporting to the NAIC.  Thus,
we analyze a more comprehensive sample and study derivatives usage by both life insurers and property-
liability insurers.  In addition, while CH use a Tobit analysis to analyze the extent of participation of
insurers in derivatives markets, we use a generalization of this approach, due to Cragg (1971), that
permits the relationship between explanatory variables and the decision to use derivatives to differ from
that linking these variables to the volume of derivatives transactions.  This is particularly important if
there is reason to believe, as we later argue, that there may be specific economic reasons why one would
want to allow such flexibility in the estimation technique.  We also extend the work in CPS and CH by
identifying economic rationales for cross-sectional variation in the volume of derivatives activity across5
organizations and by investigating some hypotheses concerning the economic relationship between the
participation and volume decisions on the part of insurers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section I formulates hypotheses and specifies
variables to be used in the empirical tests.  Section II describes the sample and explains our estimation
methodology.  The results are presented in section III, and section IV concludes.
I. Hypothesis Formulation
As mentioned above, there are two primary, non-mutually exclusive, classes of theories about
the motivations for corporate risk management — maximization of shareholder value and maximization
of managerial utility.  This section provides a more complete discussion of the theories and specifies
variables to test hypotheses concerning rationales for risk management for this sample of insurance firms.
We start by assuming that hedging is not costless, either in terms of fixed or variable costs.  In
particular, we recognize that, absent any fixed costs of setting up derivatives activities and obtaining
expertise in their management, almost all insurers would have some non-zero positions in these
additional markets for managing risk.  Thus, if the participation decision is driven by these fixed costs,
we would argue that only firms with high enough levels of risk exposure, for example, due to a high
tolerance for risk per unit of expected return, would find it worthwhile to enter the derivatives market.
However, conditional on being active in derivatives, firms/managers with high appetites for risk will
demand, ceteris paribus, lower quantities of derivatives positions to the extent that each additional unit
imposes additional marginal costs in the form of risk premiums (i.e., hedge less at the margin).  It
follows, according to this hypothesis, that certain measures of risk may have opposite signs in the
participation vs. value regressions.  With this general idea in mind, we now turn to specific rationales
that have been provided for why insurance corporations may choose to engage in risk management.3If actual capital falls between 150 and 200 percent of risk-based capital, the commissioner
has the obligation to require the insurer to present a business plan indicating actions the firm will
take to improve its financial position. If actual capital falls between 150 and 100 percent of risk-
based capital, the commissioner must examine the company and institute corrective action if
necessary.  When actual capital falls between 100 percent and 70 percent of risk-based capital, the
commissioner is authorized to rehabilitate or liquidate the company; and when actual capital falls
below 70 percent of risk-based capital, the commissioner is required to seize control of the
company (see Cummins, Harrington, and Niehaus, 1994).
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Shareholder Value Considerations:
Financial Distress.  One important theory of corporate risk management is that firms engage
in hedging activities to avoid the costs of financial distress.  In addition to the direct costs resulting from
bankruptcy e.g., legal fees and court costs, shareholders also face costs arising prior to bankruptcy.
These include such factors as reputational loss that may affect the firm’s ability to retain its relationships
with key employees, customers, or suppliers.  
The hypothesis that firms engage in risk management to avoid nontradable costs associated with
financial distress seems particularly applicable to the insurance industry.  Insurers are subject to stringent
solvency regulation by the states that includes detailed reporting requirements, computerized audit ratio
tests, extensive site audits, and the recently adopted risk-based capital standards (Klein, 1995).
Insurance commissioners can and do sometimes seize control of financially troubled insurers long before
the value of assets falls below the value of liabilities.  Even prior to seizure, commissioners can impose
restrictions on firm growth and on the composition of asset portfolios.  Indeed, the risk-based capital
laws now in effect in all states require commissioners to take specified actions when a firms risk-based
capital ratio, defined as the ratio of actual capital to risk-based capital, falls below certain thresholds.
Such actions will reduce the value of the owners’ interest in the firm and may ultimately result in the
company being seized and liquidated.
3 4We also tested dummy variables for the more stringent (lower) risk-based capital
thresholds.  These variables did not perform well because few insurers fall below the lower
thresholds. 
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We specify several variables to capture the effects of potential distress costs on the participation
and volume decisions of insurers.  The first is the firm’s capital-to-asset ratio.  The rationale is that firms
with high capital-to-asset ratios are less likely to experience financial distress because they hold adequate
capital to cushion the firm against adverse loss or investment shocks (Stulz, 1996).  In this sense, equity
capital serves as a substitute for hedging as a way to avoid the costs of financial distress.  We expect an
inverse relationship between the capital-to-asset ratio and the decision to engage in derivatives
transactions.  However, as noted earlier, conditional on having a high enough risk exposure to make
derivatives activities worthwhile, firms with a bigger appetite for leverage may find it less appealing to
pay the marginal cost of hedging additional units, resulting in a lower than average level of derivatives
activity for these firms.
A second variable we specify to measure the effects of distress costs pertains directly to the risk-
based capital system.  This variable is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the highest risk-based capital
threshold is binding, i.e., if a firm’s capital is less than 200 percent of its risk-based capital.
4 A continuous
version of this variable equal to the insurer’s actual risk-based capital ratio also is tested.  The expected
signs of the risk-based capital variables are ambiguous.  The earlier discussion suggests a positive sign
on the risk-based capital dummy variable and a negative sign on the risk-based capital ratio.  However,
opposite signs are also possible, either because the insurer is experiencing financial difficulties, or
because it refrains from hedging to avoid additional regulatory costs. The latter effect could arise if
insurance regulators are skeptical of the use of derivatives by insurers, believing that derivatives tend to
be used for speculation.  5We refer here to the insurer’s own preferred stock rather than to preferred stock held as
an asset by the insurer.  Surplus notes are a financial instrument similar to preferred stock that
mutual insurers are permitted to use as capital, subject to advance approval by the regulator.
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A third financial distress variable that we consider is the ratio of preferred capital stock and
surplus notes to total assets.
5  The rationale is that the use of such subordinated claims is a substitute for
hedging (Sinkey and Carter, 1994, Dolde, 1996).  The predicted sign on this variable is negative since
the economic logic is similar to that used in the discussion of the capital/asset ratio.
To test the hypothesis that reputation plays a role in risk management, we specify a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the insurer primarily distributes its products through insurance brokers rather than
through a tied (exclusive) distribution network.  The logic here is that brokers have  relationships with
more than one insurer and thus can direct business to a variety of sources.  Such independent distributors
tend to be extremely sensitive to the financial condition of insurers in order to serve their customers and
to avoid “errors and omissions” lawsuits.  In addition, such distributors are knowledgeable and
sophisticated in interpreting information concerning financial conditions.  Insurers using the independent
distribution channel are thus expected to be more likely to engage in corporate risk management in order
to avoid reputational costs, than are insurers using the exclusive distribution channel.  We test this
hypothesis by including a dummy variable equal to 1 if the insurer uses the brokerage distribution channel
and equal to zero otherwise.  We expect this variable to be positively related to the use of derivatives.
Interest Rate Risk and Investment Portfolio Structure.  Like other financial intermediaries,
insurers issue a variety of debt claims and invest the proceeds in financial assets.  The data suggest that
both life and property-liability insurers tend to have positive equity duration gaps, with the duration of
assets exceeding the duration of liabilities (Staking and Babbel, 1995, Cummins and Weiss, 1991).  There
is also evidence that insurers seek to hedge the resulting duration and convexity risk (Babbel and6Maturity is used here as a proxy for duration because the regulatory statements do not
provide enough information to calculate duration. 
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Santomero, 1997).  To capture the effects of hedging activities designed to manage interest rate risk,
we specify a proxy for duration gap variable that is equal to the difference between the weighted average
maturity of insurer assets and liabilities.
6  We expect a positive relationship between our proxy for the
duration gap and the use of derivatives.
Although both life and property-liability insurers invest the majority of their funds in high-grade,
publicly-traded bonds, they also invest in assets with higher default risk, return volatilities and/or lower
liquidity. Clearly, insurers might desire to hedge part of these default/volatility/liquidity risks.  For
example, investments in real estate may expose insurers to more price and liquidity risk than they would
like to retain.  Some life insurers also invest heavily in privately placed bonds and mortgages, which are
subject to liquidity risk and often contain embedded options.  Moreover, both life and property-liability
insurers invest in collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), which expose them to similar risks.
To capture hedging activities relating to asset risk, we include in our analysis the proportion of
insurer assets invested in relatively risky (in terms of price and/or liquidity measures) classes of assets.
Specifically, we include separate variables that measure the proportion of assets invested in stocks, real
estate, privately placed bonds, and both private and publicly traded CMOs.  These variables are expected
to be positively related to the use of derivatives.
With the increasing internationalization of financial markets, insurers have begun to invest more
heavily in foreign securities, either as a hedge against foreign liabilities or simply to enhance portfolio
diversification and take advantage of attractive yields.  Although insurers are sophisticated portfolio
managers, we have no reason to believe that they have a comparative advantage in managing exchange10
rate risk.  Accordingly, they may decide to hedge this component of the risk of investing in foreign
securities or holding foreign liabilities.  
We use several variables to test the hypothesis that insurers use derivatives to manage exchange
rate risk.  The first measures the proportions of assets in non-U.S. and non-Canadian stocks and bonds.
Other proxies for foreign risk exposure include a dummy variable, set equal to 1 if the insurer has foreign
liabilities and equal to zero otherwise, and an interaction variable equal to the product of the foreign
liabilities dummy variable and the ratio of foreign bonds and stocks to total assets.  A dummy variable
set equal to 1 if the insurer has any foreign assets and zero otherwise is also tested along with the
interaction between this dummy variable and the dummy variable for exposure to foreign liabilities.  We
expect a positive relationship between the foreign exposure variables and the use of derivatives. A
negative relationship is expected between the asset/liability interaction variables and the use of
derivatives since holding both foreign assets and foreign liabilities creates a natural hedge against
exchange rate risk that may substitute for hedging through the use of foreign exchange derivatives.
Certain classes of liabilities also potentially expose insurers to abnormal risks.  For life insurers,
these include group annuities and individual life insurance and annuities. Group annuities are held by
sophisticated institutional investors such as corporate pension plans, which are generally believed to be
highly sensitive to both yields and insurer financial ratings.  Individual life insurance and annuities are
relatively long maturity contracts that contain numerous embedded options and are particularly sensitive
to changes in interest rates.  Property-liability insurers also issue relatively long-maturity liabilities in the
commercial casualty lines such as general liability and workers’ compensation insurance.  
To capture the effects of liability risk on the use of derivatives, we separately include the
proportions of reserves in individual life insurance and annuities and in group annuities in the life insurer
analysis.   These variables are expected to be positively related to the use of derivatives.  For property-7The near-insolvency of Equitable Life following its loss of nearly $1 billion due to
unhedged GIC contracts was a clear case in point (Finn, 1988).
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liability insurers, we include as a variable the proportion of premiums written in commercial liability
(except products liability) and workers’ compensation insurance and separately include the proportion
of premiums written in products liability insurance.  Products liability insurance is included separately
because losses from this line of business are subject to unusually high volatility.  Thus, insurers with a
relatively high exposure to products liability may have an especially strong incentive to hedge to the
extent they believe that there exist financial securities that can be used to hedge these types of risks.  The
commercial liability/workers’ compensation variable and the products liability variable are expected to
be positively related to the use of derivatives if the risk of these lines of business motivates insurers to
hedge.  On the other hand, because these lines have relatively long payout-tails, they provide a natural
hedge against the duration risk of long-term assets held by insurers and thus may reduce somewhat the
need to manage interest rate risk through derivatives transactions (Cummins, Phillips, and Smith, 1997).
Life insurers issue another type of debt claim, guaranteed investment contracts (GICs), similar
to structured notes, that are purchased primarily by institutional investors.  GICs are yield sensitive and
contain embedded options that are likely to be exercised in response to changes in interest rates and
other economic fluctuations.  Insurers are well aware of the risks of issuing GICs,
7 as well as the
increasing sensitivity of GIC investors to insurer financial quality (Liscio, 1990).  Accordingly, we expect
an insurer’s GIC exposure to be positively related to the use of derivatives; and we test this hypothesis
using the ratio of GIC’s to total reserves.
The Underinvestment Problem.  The classic underinvestment problem was first identified by
Myers (1977).  The basic argument is that the presence of debt in the firm’s capital structure can lead
firms to forego positive net present value projects if the gains primarily augment the value of the firm’s12
debt. The underinvestment problem is more likely to occur in firms that are relatively highly leveraged,
providing a motivation for firms to hedge to avoid shocks to equity that result in high leverage ratios.
A related problem, identified by Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) arises if external funds are more
costly than internal funds, due to, say, information asymmetries between insiders and outsiders.  Firms
may hedge to reduce the variability of their income stream and thus help to ensure that adequate internal
funds are available to take advantage of attractive projects.
Researchers often use growth rates to proxy for the presence of investment opportunities that
might motivate a firm to hedge.  However, the growth rate variables we tested (growth in premiums and
assets) were not statistically significant.  For life insurers, we are able to specify a  unique variable to
serve as a proxy for growth opportunities (or, rather, the lack thereof).  This variable is the proportion
of an insurer’s new premium volume that arises from the reinvestment of policyholder dividends and
coupons from existing policies.  The argument is that firms that have a relatively high proportion of
revenues from existing policies rather than new policy sales are lacking in growth opportunities.  We
expect this variable to be inversely related to the use of derivatives.  No comparable variable is available
for property-liability insurers.
Taxes.  Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the presence of a convex income tax schedule provides
a motive for corporate hedging.  With a convex tax schedule, firms can minimize taxes and enhance firm
value by reducing the volatility of earnings, thus providing a motivation for risk management.  The
corporate tax schedules affecting both life and property-liability insurers have convex segments, and
property-liability insurers, in particular, are known to engage in especially active tax management
(Cummins and Grace, 1994). 
Because the amount of information insurers disclose to regulators on Federal income taxation
is very limited, we are not able to test variables commonly used in the existing literature such as the8The 25 percent threshold was chosen somewhat arbitrarily because we do not actually
know which insurers are paying the AMT and which are paying taxes at the regular rate.  Because
insurers do not provide information on tax loss carryforwards, insurers paying the regular tax rate
could have ratios of incurred taxes to income that are less than 34 percent.  Experimentation with
a few other reasonable thresholds, such as 20 percent and 15 percent, indicate that the results are
not sensitive to the choice of a threshold in the 15 to 25 percent range.
9We also tested a continuous tax variable equal to the ratio of taxes incurred to net income
before taxes.  This variable was never statistically significant and was eliminated from the models
reported in the paper.
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amount of unused tax loss carryforwards (e.g., Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993).  However, we are
able to specify dummy variables to proxy for insurers’ tax positions.  We specify a dummy variable equal
to 1 if the insurer paid no Federal income tax in 1994 and 0 otherwise; and analogous variables are
specified for 1992 and 1993.  The expected signs of these variables are ambiguous.  On the one hand,
not paying taxes may indicate the presence of tax loss carryforwards that the insurer risks losing if it does
not generate positive taxable income.  This rationale would predict positive signs for the “no tax” dummy
variables.  On the other hand, if the insurer has been paying little or nothing in taxes, it may indicate that
it does not expect to pay taxes in the future and hence does not have a tax motivation for engaging in
hedging activities.  
A second variable designed to capture the effects of tax-induced hedging is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the insurer’s ratio of incurred Federal income taxes to pre-tax income is between zero and
25 percent and equal to zero otherwise.  This variable is designed as an indicator for insurers that are
in the convex segment of the tax code, between the alternate minimum tax (AMT) rate (20 percent) and
the regular corporate tax rate (34 percent).
8  This “AMT” dummy variable is expected to have a positive
relationship with the use of derivatives.
910For this reason, it is often argued that mutuals are likely to be most successful in lines of
insurance which require relatively low managerial discretion in underwriting, pricing, and claims
settlement.   When little managerial discretion is required to operate the business, the owner-
policyholders are better able to monitor the performance of managers and managers have less
latitude to pursue their own objectives at the expense of the owners’.  Conversely, stocks are
expected to be more successful in lines of insurance where more managerial discretion is required
because it is easier for owners to monitor and control managers in the stock ownership form.  A
significant amount of empirical support for this managerial discretion hypothesis has been
provided in the prior literature (e.g., Mayers and Smith, 1988, 1990).
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The Maximization of Managerial Utility 
We argue that mutual insurance companies are likely to be more affected by incentive conflicts
between managers and owners than are stock companies.  The mutual ownership form does not provide
effective mechanisms that owners can use to control and discipline managers, such as the alienable
claims,  voting rights in elections for directors, and the proxy and takeover fights available to the owners
of stock companies.  Thus, mutual managers are more free to follow their own objectives to a greater
degree than the managers of stock firms and are more likely to behave as utility, rather than value,
maximizers.
10 
Mutual managers may also be more likely to behave in a risk averse manner precisely because
mutuals do not have stock.  Thus, the opportunities to structure management compensation systems
(such as stock option plans) that reward managers for maximizing value are very limited in the mutual
ownership form.  If managers of mutuals exhibit utility maximizing behavior, they are likely to engage
in derivatives transactions for reasons other than value-maximization.  Thus, mutual managers may
engage in more derivatives activity than might be desirable from the owners’ perspective.  
To test for the potential effect of managerial risk aversion on hedging behavior in the insurance
industry, we specify a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is organized as a mutual insurance11The reasons for conducting our tests with the company rather than the group as the unit
of observation are explained below. 
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company and equal to zero otherwise.  We expect this variable to be positively related to the use of
derivatives.  
Other Variables
We expect firm size to be related to derivatives activity.  Size will be positively correlated with
derivatives activity if there are significant economies of scale in human capital investment and derivatives
trading (Booth, Smith and Stolz, 1984, Hoyt, 1989) and if derivatives operations require significant
investments in computer hardware and software (Stulz, 1996).  However, these scale economies, if they
exist, may be offset by the fact that larger insurers may be more diversified and therefore in less need of
derivatives contracts as additional risk management tools.  Our overall expectation is that information
and transactions cost economies of scale will dominate any built in diversification benefits, resulting in
greater usage by larger insurers.  The variable used to test for the size effect is the natural logarithm of
total assets.
Another scale-related variable included in our analysis is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the
insurer is a member of a group of insurers where at least one other member of the group is active in
derivatives trading and to zero otherwise.
11  If one member of the group is involved in derivatives
trading, then the marginal cost of other group members taking advantage of these risk/return
opportunities is declining to the extent that each member of the group rationally does not duplicate these
fixed costs.  We expect this dummy variable to be positively related to the use of derivatives.12Thus, the excluded category not represented by the group affiliate dummy and
unaffiliated single company dummy variable consists of members of groups where at most one
group member is active in derivatives. 
13Lehman Brothers (1994) reports that some of the more sophisticated insurers have been
using derivatives for more than twenty years.  However, only a few large insurers fall into this
category.
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A dummy variable is also included for unaffiliated single companies.
12  Unaffiliated insurers may
engage in more risk management through derivatives trading than insurers that are members of groups
because unaffiliated companies forfeit a source of diversification by not being organized as a group.  An
insurance group is similar to a portfolio of options, worth more to the owners than an option on a
portfolio.  Under corporate law, the creditors of an insolvent subsidiary cannot reach the assets of other
members of the group unless they are successful in “piercing the corporate veil,” which usually requires
a finding of fraud or similar wrong-doing by the group’s owners.  Thus, we expect the unaffiliated
company variable to be positively related to the use of derivatives.
Although derivatives are a recent tool for risk management by most insurers,
13 they have long
used reinsurance as a way of hedging underwriting risk.  More recently, insurers have used financial
reinsurance to hedge their exposure to, for example, interest rate and market risk (Tiller and Tiller,
1995).   If there is a significant relationship between underwriting risk and returns in financial markets,
then reinsurance designed to reduce underwriting risk might serve as a substitute for derivatives
activities.  Financial reinsurance is more likely to be a substitute for transactions in financial derivatives,
but this type of reinsurance is a relatively recent product that is imperfectly proxied by our reinsurance
variable.  On the other hand, reinsurance and financial derivatives might be complements if insurers that
engage in hedging of underwriting risk are also more likely to hedge financial risk.  We account for the14This measure of reinsurance is also used by Colquitt and Hoyt (1995) and Mayers and
Smith (1990).
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use of reinsurance by including in our regressions the ratio of ceded reinsurance premiums written to
direct premiums written plus reinsurance assumed.
14
II. Data and Methodology
The Data
Our data come from Schedule DB of the 1994 regulatory annual statements filed by insurers with
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners.  Parts A through D of Schedule DB list individual
transactions across four general categories of derivatives; (A) options, caps and floors owned, (B)
options, caps and floors written, (C) collar, swap and forward agreements, and (D) futures.  In part E
of schedule DB,  insurers are required to report their year-end counterparty exposure for all the contracts
contained in sections A through D.  The explanatory variables used in our analysis also are taken from
the 1994 NAIC regulatory statements.
  The sample of insurers we analyze initially consisted of all life and property-liability companies
that filed regulatory annual statements with the National Association of Insurance Commissioners for
report-year 1994, a total of 1,760 life insurers and 2,707 PC insurers.  Initial screening resulted in the
elimination of firms with zero or negative assets, premiums, or surplus (equity) and firms that lack
adequate group affiliation identifiers.  The screening criteria resulted in the elimination of a large number
of very small firms (in the aggregate they account for only 2.2 percent of industry assets).  The final
sample consists of 1,204 life insurers and 1,664 PC insurers. 
Many insurers are members of groups that operate under common ownership.  Because members
of groups are likely to share common financial strategies and, in many cases, common investment
departments, we considered analyzing firms at the group level as well as the individual company level.15We are aware that notional volume is, at best, an imprecise measure of the economic
value of these activities.  However, to the extent the measurement error is uncorrelated with the
explanatory variables, our estimates will remain unbiased.
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However, Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997) found that the group level analysis provided virtually no
information concerning the participation decision not provided by the company level analysis and, in fact,
some interesting information was lost as a result of aggregating individual companies into groups.
Consequently, we report only the company-level analysis in this paper.  
Methodology
In this paper, we analyze the factors affecting the decision by insurers to enter the market for
derivatives as well as the factors affecting the volume of transactions undertaken.  We use probit analysis
to study the participation decision — the same approach used for this purpose by Colquitt and Hoyt
(1994) and Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997).  The dependent variable is set equal to 1 if an insurer
had any derivatives activity during 1994 or reported derivatives holdings at year end 1994 and equal to
zero otherwise.  The explanatory variables are those formulated above to test our hypotheses.  A positive
sign on an explanatory variable in the probit analysis implies that the variable is associated with a higher
than average propensity for insurers to use derivatives and vice versa if the variable carries a negative
sign.
To analyze the volume of derivatives transactions, we adopt two approaches.  The first is a Tobit
analysis.  In Tobit analysis the dependent variable is equal to zero if an insurer does not use derivatives
and equal to the volume of derivatives transactions if the insurer does use derivatives.  We use notional
amounts to measure the volume of derivative transactions.
15  Tobit analysis is a standard procedure for
dealing with censored dependent variables, where the variable is continuous for some observations but
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A criticism of Tobit analysis is that it measures the participation decision and the volume decision
simultaneously, i.e., it forces variables to have the same signs with respect to the decision to participate
and the volume of transactions, given that participation takes place.  To the extent that there are reasons,
like those noted earlier, why some variables in the participation and volume regressions should have
opposite signs, the Tobit model would be mis-specified.  Consequently, we also utilize a generalization
of the Tobit model, due to Cragg (1971), that does allow different parameter values for the participation
and quantity decisions.
Cragg’s framework is quite general and allows a variety of assumptions concerning the
underlying probability distributions entering into the participation and quantity decisions.  Here we adopt
an approach, used previously by Gunther and Siems (1995), that assumes a normal distribution model
for the participation decision and a lognormal distribution for the quantity decision, conditional on the
fact that the firm is participating in this market.  The resulting likelihood function is
Ii is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the insurer uses derivatives and zero otherwise, ß and ? are
parameter vectors, yi is the volume of derivatives used by insurer i, and Xi is a vector of independent
variables for insurer i.  The model is equivalent to estimating a probit model for the participation decision
and a lognormal regression model for the volume decision.  The two parts of the model (parameter
vectors) can be estimated separately.  It is also possible to conduct a likelihood ratio test of the
appropriateness of the Tobit model assumption that the participation and quantity decisions can be20
modeled using the same coefficients.  Results from these tests are reported and discussed in the next
section.
III.  Estimation Results
Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics on usage, by asset quartile, are shown in Table 1.  Overall, about 9.9 percent
of life insurers and 6.7 percent of property-liability insurers use derivatives.  However, usage is much
more widespread in the largest size quartile, where 31.1 percent of life and 20.1 percent of property-
liability insurers are active in derivatives markets.
Summary statistics for the remaining variables appearing in our models are presented in Table
2.  The average notional amounts of derivatives transactions during the year by life insurers is $1.7
billion, while the average notional amount of transactions for property-liability insurers is much less, only
about $300 million.  Clearly, life insurers are, on average, bigger players in derivatives markets than their
property-liability counterparts.  
Table 2 also contains data on the means of the independent variables for derivatives users and
non users, by insurer type, as well as t-tests for the significance of the differences between the means of
the variables for users and non-users.  Most of the explanatory variables have significantly different
means for users and non-users. For example, both life and property-liability insurers that use derivatives
are significantly larger than their non-user counterparts.
Life insurers engaged in derivatives activities have significantly higher than average proportions
of their assets in stocks, CMOs, privately placed bonds, and foreign securities.  Life insurance users also
have significantly higher proportions of group annuities and GICs on their balance sheets than do non-
users, and users have larger duration gaps than non-users.  The direction and significance of these mean
differences are consistent with our hypothesis that life insurers are using derivatives to hedge interest rate16The capital-to-asset ratio is known to be negatively related to size.  We control for this
correlation in our probit, Tobit, and Cragg models by including a measure of size as an
exploratory variable.
17For further information, including year-end totals and counterparty exposure, see
Cummins, Phillips, and Smith (1997).  
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risk, volatility risk, liquidity risk, and exchange rate risk. Life insurers who are derivatives users have
lower capital-to-asset ratios than non-users but are less likely to have risk-based capital ratios less than
200 percent.
16  Life insurance users are significantly less likely than non-users to have incurred a Federal
tax liability in 1993 and 1994.  Finally, users are more likely to be mutuals, less likely to be unaffiliated
companies, and more likely to have another affiliated company that is active in derivatives markets.  
Property-liability insurers that use derivatives have higher proportions of their assets in stocks,
real estate, and foreign stocks and bonds than non-users.  Users write less of their premiums in
commercial casualty insurance (other than products liability) but write more of their premiums in the
products liability line than do the non-users.  As in the case of life insurers, property-liability users have
larger duration gaps and lower capital-to-asset ratios than non-users.  Property-liability users of
derivatives are more likely to be in the AMT range of the tax schedule than non-users.  Overall, the
descriptive statistics provide suggestive evidence in support of many of our hypotheses; in particular the
hypothesis that firms with above average risk exposure, relative to overall population of insurers, will
find it beneficial to pay the fixed cost of becoming active participants in the market for derivative
securities.
Table 3 provides some descriptive data on the types of derivatives used by life and property-
liability insurers during 1994.  The table shows statistics on the transactions volume during the year,
where, as noted earlier, transactions volume is measured by notional amounts.
17  For life insurers the
transactions volume tends to be concentrated in bond and interest rate derivatives, as expected if insurers22
are using derivatives to hedge the duration and convexity risk inherent in their balance sheets.  Life
insurers also exhibit considerable activity in foreign exchange derivatives, particularly futures, forwards,
collars, and swaps.  Property-liability insurers are most active in foreign currency derivatives but also
trade substantial amounts of bond, interest rate, and equity derivatives.  We now turn to the regression
results.  In each case, we first discuss the equations capturing the decision to participate in derivatives
markets and then turn to the analysis of the volume regressions.
Multi-Variate Results: Life Insurers
The Tobit and Cragg estimation results for life insurers are presented in Table 4. The table shows
Tobit results as well as the probit and lognormal regression models estimated as part of the Cragg
analysis.  Two sets of equations are shown.  The second set (presented in the right hand side of the table)
differs from the first only in its exclusion of some of the insignificant variables.  Because the results in
the two sets of runs differ only slightly, we focus on the set with the complete list of explanatory
variables, i.e., the set of equations shown in the left hand side of the table.
The Participation Decision.  The same variables are statistically significant in the Tobit and
probit models, and the signs of the coefficients of the significant variables are the same in every instance.
This supports our view that the Tobit model is primarily capturing the participation decision and that
Cragg analysis is needed to analyze the volume decision separately. Because of the similarity of the Tobit
and probit results, we provide a generic discussion of the results concerning the participation decision.
There are several statistically significant variables in both the Tobit and probit models that
support the hypotheses set forth above concerning participation in derivatives markets.  Overall, the
results provide support for the hypotheses that insurers engage in derivative transactions to reduce the
expected costs of financial distress, manage interest rate, exchange rate, and liquidity risk, and minimize
expected tax liabilities.   The hypothesis that derivatives activities are subject to scale economies is also23
strongly supported.  However, the results provide no support for the hypothesis that the managers of
mutual insurers behave differently from managers of stock insurers.
For a more detailed analysis, we consider the Tobit and probit models in Table 4.  The capital-to-
asset ratio is highly significant and has a negative coefficient, as predicted.  This result is consistent with
the idea that highly capitalized insurers have less reason to hedge because their probability of incurring
distress costs is relatively low.  The distress costs hypothesis is also supported by the broker dummy
variable, which has a significant positive coefficient, as expected if insurers use derivatives to hedge
against potential reputational costs.  
The risk-based capital dummy variable has a negative coefficient, suggesting that insurers for
which the risk-based capital rules are binding tend to be less likely to use derivatives than those with
higher risk-based capital ratios. This result is consistent with the interpretation that insurers that do not
hedge are more likely to encounter financial distress or that insurers approaching the risk-based capital
threshold tend to avoid transacting in derivatives in an effort to reduce regulatory costs.
The coefficients of the proportions of assets in U.S. stocks, privately placed bonds, CMOs, and
foreign stocks all are statistically significant and positive, as predicted if insurers are using derivatives
to hedge volatility, liquidity, and exchange rate risk.  Moreover, higher proportions of reserves in
individual life insurance and annuities and in GICs are also significantly related to a higher than average
likelihood of using derivatives.  However, our duration gap measure is not statistically significant,
perhaps due to the fact that it is only a rough proxy for the duration and convexity risk faced by insurers.
The tax management hypothesis is supported by two significant variables, the dummy variable
for not paying taxes in 1992 and the dummy variable for being in the AMT range of the tax schedule in
1994.  Both variables are positive and significant.  The sign and significance of the former variable is
consistent with the hypotheses that insurers engage in tax management to avoid losing tax loss24
carryforwards, while the result with the latter variable is consistent with tax minimization by insurers
operating in the convex segment of the tax schedule.  However, some caution is in order in interpreting
these particular results in view of the fact that direct data on tax loss carryforwards and taxable income
are not available.
The hypothesis of economies of scale in derivatives operations is supported by two significant
variables, the logarithm of assets and the dummy variable for firms with at least one affiliate active in
derivatives.  Both variables have the expected positive coefficients.  
The Volume Decision.  The lognormal regression part of the Cragg model provides evidence
concerning what factors, if any, underlie the volume (quantity) decision.  The results from the  lognormal
regression support the hypothesis that the volume of derivatives transactions is positively related to
insurer asset size. 
Consistent with the marginal cost hypothesis set forth earlier, the estimation results provide
evidence that, conditional on being in derivatives, firms with more tolerance for risk choose to under-
hedge.  For example, firms with higher leverage (lower capital to assets), tend to have a lower value of
derivative activities. The same pattern emerges with other risk measures.  The coefficient of the
proportion of assets in privately placed bonds is negative and significant in the volume (lognormal)
regression, whereas it is positive and significant in the participation (Tobit and probit) regressions.  This
implies that insurers with high proportions of privately placed bonds are more likely to engage in
derivatives transactions, but engage in lower transaction volumes conditional on the decision to
participate, consistent with our earlier discussion.  Moreover, the coefficients on duration GAP, the
proportions of assets in real estate and publicly traded CMOs also are all negative and significant in the
lognormal regression, whereas these variables are not statistically significant in the participation models.25
An exception to this general pattern is provided by the GIC variable, which is positive and
significant in both the participation and the volume regressions.  This result may reflect the fact that
purchasers of GICs tend to be more sophisticated investors, on average, than the purchasers of other life
insurer products.  Accordingly, they may engage in more active monitoring of firm risk and hedging
decisions than other investors, imposing a market penalty on insurers that under-hedge their GIC
exposure.
Finally, the “active affiliate” dummy variable is negative and significant in the lognormal
regression, whereas it was positive and significant in the Tobit and probit models.  This seems intuitively
reasonable, i.e., conditional on size, if a group’s derivatives transactions are spread among a larger
number of affiliates. The amounts transacted by individual affiliates are likely to be less than if a given
affiliate were the only member of the group engaged in derivatives activity. 
Multi-Variate Results: Property-Liability Insurers
The Tobit and Cragg estimation results for property-liability insurers are shown in Table 5.  As
above, we first discuss the Tobit and probit models and then turn to a discussion of the lognormal
regression model.  
The Participation Decision. The Tobit and probit results for property-liability insurers provide
further support for the principal hypotheses discussed above.  The capital-to-asset ratio is statistically
significant and negative, consistent with the hypothesis that insurers engage in derivatives transactions
to reduce the expected costs of financial distress.  The ratio of actual capital to risk-based capital is
significant and carries a positive coefficient.  Consistent with the life insurer results, this variable suggests
that insurers are less likely to use derivatives the closer they are to the risk-based capital threshold.  
The hypotheses that insurers use derivatives to manage asset volatility and liquidity risk are
supported by the significant positive coefficients on the proportions of the asset portfolio is stocks and18For example, an insurer writing a products liability policy on a drug manufacturer could
hedge the risk of lawsuits by taking a derivatives position in the manufacturer’s stock.  This might
be especially effective in hedging the risk of products liability losses that affect many of the
manufacturer’s customers simultaneously, such as those resulting from unforeseen side effects of
a particular drug.
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real estate, respectively.  We also find support for the hypothesis that insurers use derivatives to manage
foreign exchange rate risk.  The dummy variables for exposure to foreign assets and foreign liabilities
are both significant with positive coefficients, consistent with hedging of foreign exchange rate risk.  The
interaction variable defined as the product of the foreign asset and foreign liability dummy variables has
a statistically significant negative coefficient.  This suggests that insurers with exposures in both foreign
assets and foreign liabilities have a natural foreign currency hedge, reducing the need to hedge through
derivatives transactions.
The proportion of premiums written in the commercial long-tail lines (other than products
liability) has a significantly negative coefficient.  This result affirms prior findings in Cummins, Phillips,
and Smith (1997) and is consistent with the idea that writing commercial long-tail lines provides a natural
hedge for insurers against the duration risk of their intermediate and long-term bonds.  The proportion
of premiums written in products liability insurance, on the other hand, has a significant positive
coefficient, suggesting that insurers who are active writers of products liability insurance feel the need
to hedge the volatility inherent in this type of coverage.  Such hedges often can be constructed by
transacting in derivatives on the stocks of their insured policyholders.
18  
The ceded reinsurance variable is negative and significant for property-liability insurers, whereas
it was insignificant in the life insurance equations.  The negative sign on this variable is consistent with
the hypothesis that firms that hedge their underwriting exposure have lower overall risk levels and
therefore have less need to pay the fixed costs of entering the market for financial derivatives.  The result27
is also consistent with the finding that insurers appear to hedge products liability risk using derivatives,
because reinsurance would be another way to manage the risk of products liability losses.
The results also provide support for the tax management hypothesis.  The dummy variable, set
equal to 1 if no taxes are incurred in the current year, is statistically significant with a negative
coefficient.  This implies that insurers that are not paying taxes do not have a motive to hedge in order
to avoid higher taxes due to the convexity of the income tax schedule.  Although one might think that
insurers would hedge to avoid income volatility that might drive their taxable income into the convex
segment of the tax schedule, property-liability insurers have been very successful over a long period of
time in hitting their taxable income targets through the use of tax favored investments and the
manipulation of loss reserves (see Grace, 1990, Cummins and Grace, 1994).  Life insurers have less
ability to manage their reserves and are taxed under a different section of the tax code than property-
liability insurers.  As a result, they have been less successful in managing their taxable income through
conventional techniques and, therefore, are more likely than property-liability insurers to use derivatives
transactions to accomplish this objective.
The property-liability models provide further support for the hypothesis that there are economies
of scale in running derivatives operations. The log of total assets has a highly significant positive
coefficient, and the “active affiliate” dummy variable is also positive and significant.  The unaffiliated
single company dummy variable also has a significant positive coefficient, consistent with the hypothesis
that such insurers forfeit a source of diversification by not being organized as a group and thus may have
a greater need to hedge through the use of derivatives.  Because property-liability insurers experience
more volatility in their losses and income than do life insurers, diversification through operating as an19For example, several insurers have set up subsidiaries to write property insurance in
Florida and California because of the risk of catastrophic loss due to hurricanes and earthquakes. 
If a major catastrophe were to wipe out the equity of a subsidiary, the parent insurer would not be
required to post additional capital, unlike the case where the parent insurer were to write the
property insurance policy.
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insurance group is more important in the property-liability insurance industry, leading to the significance
of the variable here whereas it was insignificant in the life insurer models.
19
The broker dummy variable is insignificant in the Tobit and probit models for property-liability
insurers.  Thus, the hypothesis that insurers enter derivatives markets in part to protect their financial
reputations with independent distributors is not supported for this class of insurers.  This is perhaps not
surprising given that most of the concern about financial reputation and “run on the bank” problems has
arisen in the life insurance market.  
The Volume Decision.  The lognormal regression model is somewhat less informative for
property-liability insurers than for life insurers.  However, the significant positive coefficient on the log
of assets variables provides further support for the hypothesis that larger firms tend to engage in a higher
volume of derivatives usage.  
The lognormal model for property-liability insurers also provides additional support for our
hypothesis that, conditional on being in the derivatives market, firms/managers with higher tolerance for
risk will demand, ceteris paribus, lower quantities of derivatives due to the marginal costs of hedging.
For example, the foreign liabilities dummy variable is negative and significant in the volume regression
whereas it was positive and significant in the participation (Tobit and probit) regressions.  Likewise, the
real estate variable reverses sign and becomes insignificant in the volume regression and the proportion
of assets in stocks becomes insignificant.  Several other significant risk variables have opposite signs
and/or become insignificant in the volume regressions in comparison with the Tobit and probit models.29
Thus, although further research is clearly needed into this marginal costs hypothesis, our results provide
some preliminary evidence that this hypothesis may help to explain insurer demand for derivative
securities, conditional on being participants in this market.
IV. Conclusion
In this paper, we formulate and test a number of hypotheses regarding insurer participation and
volume decisions in derivatives markets.  We base our hypotheses on the financial theories of corporate
risk management that have developed over the past several years.  The two primary, and non-mutually
exclusive, strands of the theoretical literature hold that corporations are motivated to hedge in order to
maximize value and/or to maximize the utility of managers.  Our results provide support for the
hypothesis that insurers hedge to maximize value.  Although we do not find support for the managerial
utility maximization hypothesis, this may be due to the limited information in our data set pertaining to
this hypothesis.  For example, we do not have data on commonly used variables such as the proportion
of  an insurer’s stock that is owned by managers or on the presence of stock options and other incentive
features in managerial compensation plans.  More definitive tests of managerial utility maximization will
be conducted in future work we are undertaking on the derivatives activities of publicly traded insurers.
Several specific hypotheses are supported by our analysis.  In terms of participation in derivatives
markets, we find evidence that insurers are motivated to use financial derivatives to reduce the expected
costs of financial distress —  the decision to use derivatives is inversely related to the capital-to-asset
ratio for both life and property-liability insurers.  We also find evidence that insurers use derivatives to
hedge asset volatility, liquidity, and exchange rate risks.  Life insurers appear to use derivatives to
manage interest rate risk and the risk from embedded options present in their individual life insurance
and GIC liabilities.  Tax considerations also play an important role in motivating derivatives market
participation decisions by insurers.  Finally, we provide support for the hypothesis that there are30
significant economies of scale in running derivatives operations.  Thus, only large firms and/or those with
higher than average risk exposure would find it worthwhile to pay the fixed cost of setting up a
derivatives operation.
Interestingly, however, we often find that, conditional on being a user of derivatives, the
relationship between the volume of derivatives activities and these same risk measures often display
exactly the opposite result to those found in the usage regression.  We argue that this result is broadly
consistent with the hypothesis that there is also a per unit risk premium associated with hedging and that,
conditional on having risk exposures large enough to warrant participation, firms with a larger appetite
for risk will be less willing than average to pay this marginal cost. Such firms therefore have larger than
average risk exposure (lower than average derivatives positions) vis a vis the sub-group of insurers that
use derivatives, who themselves may be, on average, higher-risk firms than non-users.
Our conclusion that insurers with higher than average asset risk exposures use derivative
securities has important public policy implications.  State regulators are currently considering the
imposition of new restrictions on insurer derivatives transactions. While more work is clearly needed
regarding the net effect of derivatives on the risk profile of insurers, it seems premature to deny access
to this potentially valuable risk management technique.  Restricting derivatives could increase risk for
some insurers now participating in derivatives markets and would reduce the ability of other insurers to
access this source of risk management.  The findings are also relevant in terms of reporting requirements
imposed by state insurance regulators, the Financial Accounting Standards Board, and the Securities and
Exchange Commission. More detailed and accurate reporting is likely to be beneficial in facilitating
market monitoring of insurer derivatives activities.  Such monitoring is likely to be much more effective
than additional regulation in ensuring that derivatives are used to enhance insurance market efficiency
rather than to increase market risk.References
Babbel, David F. and Anthony Santomero, 1997, “Financial Risk Management By Insurers: An Analysis
of the Process,” Journal of Risk and Insurance, forthcoming.
Booth, James R., Smith, Richard L., Stolz, Richard W., 1984, “Use of Interest Rate Futures by Financial
Institutions,” Journal of Bank Research, 15: 15-20.
Breedon, Douglas, and S. Viswanathan, 1996, “Why Do Firms Hedge? An Asymmetric Information
Model,” Working paper, Duke University, Durham, N.C.
Brewer, Elijah, William E. Jackson, and James T. Moser, 1996, “Alligators in the Swamp: The Impact
of Derivatives on the Financial Performance of Depository Institutions,” Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 28: 482-501.
Brewer, Elijah, Bernadette A. Minton, and James T. Moser, 1994, “Interest-Rate Derivatives and Bank
Lending,” Working paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Chicago, IL.
Colquitt, L. Lee and Robert E. Hoyt, 1995, “Determinants of Corporate Hedging Behavior:  Evidence
from the Life Insurance Industry,”  Working Paper, University of Georgia, Athens, GA.
Cragg, John G., 1971, “Some Statistical Models for Limited Dependent Variables With Application to
the Demand for Durable Goods,” Econometrica 39: 829-844.
Cummins, J. David and Hélyette Geman, 1995, "Pricing Insurance Catastrophe Futures and Call
Spreads: An Arbitrage Approach," Journal of Fixed Income 4: 46-57. 
Cummins, J. David and Elizabeth Grace, 1994, “Tax Management and Investment Strategies of
Property-Liability Insurers,” Journal of Banking and Finance 18: 43-72.
Cummins, J. David, Scott E. Harrington, and Gregory Niehaus, 1994, "Risk-Based Capital
Requirements for Property-Liability Insurers:  A Financial Analysis," in Edward Altman and
Irwin Vanderhoof, eds., The Financial Dynamics of the Insurance Industry (Homewood, IL:
Irwin Professional Publishers). 
Cummins, J. David and Joan Lamm-Tennant, 1993,  Financial Management of Life Insurance
Companies (Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers).
Cummins, J. David, Richard D. Phillips, and Stephen D. Smith, 1997, “Corporate Hedging in the
Insurance Industry: The Use of Financial Derivatives by US Insurers.” The North American
Actuarial Journal 1 (January 1997): 13-49.
Cummins, J. David and Mary A. Weiss, 1991, “The Structure, Conduct, and Regulation of the Property-
Liability Insurance Industry,” in R.W. Kopcke and R.E. Randall, eds., The Financial Condition
and Regulation of Insurance Companies (Boston: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston).DeMarzo, Peter and Darrell Duffie, 1995, “Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting,”
Review of Financial Studies 8: 743-772.
Dolde, Walter, 1996, “Hedging, Leverage, and Primitive Risk,” The Journal of Financial Engineering
4: 187-216.
Fenn, George W., Mitch Post, and Steven A. Sharpe, 1996, “Why Nonfinancial Firms Use Interest Rate
Derivatives,” Working Paper, Capital Markets Section, Federal Reserve Board, Washington
D.C.
Finn, Edwin A., Jr., 1988, “The Mess at Equitable Life,” Forbes 142 (September 19): 36-40. 
Froot, Kenneth A., David S. Scharfstein, and Jeremy C. Stein, 1993, “Risk Management: Coordinating
Investment and Financing Policies,” Journal of Finance, 68: 1629-1658.
Grace, Elizabeth, 1990, “Property-Liability Reserve Errors: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance 63: 28-46.
Greene, William H., 1990, Econometric Analysis.  New York: Macmillan Publishing Company.
Gunther, Jeffery W., and Thomas F. Siems, 1995, “The Likelihood and Extent of Bank Participation in
Derivative Activities,” Working Paper, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, Dallas TX.
Hoyt, Robert E., 1989, “Use of Financial Futures by Life Insurers,” Journal of Risk and Insurance,
56:740-749.
Klein, Robert W., 1995, “Insurance Regulation In Transition,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 62: 363-
404.
Lehman Brothers, 1994, “Derivatives Use By Insurers: How Derivatives Are Changing the Way Insurers
Operate” (New York).
Liscio, John, 1990, “The GICs Blacklist: Big and Small Insurers Are on It,” Barron's 70 (February 19):
18,27.
Mayers, David and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 1990, “On the Corporate Demand for Insurance: Evidence
from the Reinsurance Market, Journal of Business 63: 19-40.
Mayers, David and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 1988, "Ownership Structure Across Lines of Property-
Liability Insurance," Journal of Law and Economics 31: 351-378.    
Mayers, David and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., 1987, “Corporate Insurance and the Underinvestment
Problem,” Journal of Risk and Insurance 54: 45-54.
Myers, Stewart C., 1977, “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics 5:
147-175.Nance, Deana R., Clifford W. Smith, Jr., and Charles W. Smithson, 1993, “On the Determinants of
Corporate Hedging, Journal of Finance, 68: 267-284.
Shanker, Latha, 1996, “Derivatives Usage and Interest Rate Risk of Large Banking Firms,” Journal of
Futures Markets 16: 459-474.
Sinkey, Joseph F., and David Carter, 1995, “The Determinants of Hedging and Derivatives Activities
by U.S. Commercial Banks,”  Working Paper, University of Georgia, Athens, GA.
Smith, Clifford W. Jr. and René M. Stulz, 1985, “The Determinants of Firms’ Hedging Policies,”
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 20: 391-405.
Staking, Kim B., and David F. Babbel, 1995, “The Relation Between Capital Structure, Interest Rate
Sensitivity, and Market Value in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry,” Journal of Risk and
Insurance, 62: 690-718.
Stulz, René M., 1996, “Rethinking Risk Management,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9: 8-24.
Stulz, René M., 1990, “Managerial Discretion and Optimal Financing Policies,” Journal of Financial
Economics 26: 3-27.
Tiller, John E., and Denise Fagerberg Tiller, 1995, Life, Health & Annuity Reinsurance, ACTEX
Publications: Winsted, CT.
Tufano, Peter, 1996, “Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices
in the Gold Mining Industry,” Journal of Finance 51: 1097-1137.
Venkatachalam, Mohan, 1996, “Value-Relevance of Banks’ Derivatives Disclosures,” Journal of
Accounting and Economics 22: 327-355.
The Wharton School and The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 1995, Survey of Derivatives Usage Among
U.S. Non-Financial Firms.  Philadelphia, PA.Table 1





Quartile 1 0.00% 0.24%
Quartile 2 1.00% 3.13%
Quartile 3 7.31% 3.13%
Quartile 4 31.13% 20.14%
All Firms 9.88% 6.67%
Number of Insurers 1,204 1,664Table 2
Summary Statistics:  Derivative Users vs. Non-Users
        Life/Health Insurers   Property/Casualty Insurers
















Total Notional Amount Transacted During the Year (000000's) 1,711.97    7,311.41     299.254      855.496 
Log(Total Notional Amount Transacted During the Year) 18.6054 2.7519 17.082            2.716 
Log(Total Assets) 21.5961 1.8919 17.5846 2.3763 17.807 20.050 1.756 17.568 1.841 13.769
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Stocks 6.71% 9.79% 7.28% 15.17% 0.397 19.72% 16.17% 9.73% 14.21% 7.090
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Real Estate 9.32% 8.58% 6.07% 11.07% 3.103 2.73% 3.66% 1.42% 3.63% 3.665
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Publicly Traded CMO's 12.51% 11.26% 7.77% 13.91% 3.594
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Privately Placed Commercial Bonds 8.89% 7.68% 1.97% 5.11% 13.211
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Privately Placed CMO's 0.37% 0.91% 0.06% 0.34% 7.184
Percent of Asset Portfolio in CMO's 5.20% 7.76% 3.98% 8.50% 1.471
Foreign Denominated Liabilities Dummy Variable 0.2101 0.4091 0.0313 0.1743 8.832 0.243 0.431 0.035 0.185 10.051
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Non-US and Non-Canadian Bonds 2.81% 7.86% 0.53% 2.53% 6.840 1.01% 1.67% 0.34% 1.96% 3.486
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Non-US and Non-Canadian Stocks 0.30% 1.54% 0.11% 1.37% 1.460 0.57% 1.57% 0.09% 0.69% 6.179
(Foreign Bonds and Stocks) x Foreign Liabilities Interaction Term 0.55% 1.31% 0.09% 1.72% 2.852 0.36% 1.14% 0.03% 0.29% 8.319
Foreign Asset Dummy Variable 0.667 0.474 0.225 0.418 10.672
Foreign Assets Dummy Variable x Foreign Liabilities Interaction Term 0.162 0.370 0.017 0.131 9.301
Percent of LH Reserves in Individual Life and Annuity Reserves 52.63% 31.43% 47.13% 38.08% 1.520
Percent of Life/Health Reserves in Group Annuities 6.49% 11.28% 1.69% 7.72% 6.098
Percent of LH Reserves in Guaranteed Investment Contracts 5.95% 13.80% 0.37% 3.57% 10.485
Percent of LH Premiums Due to Dividends Used to Purchase Paid-up Additions 21.31% 28.60% 18.72% 32.44% 0.835
Percent of P&C DPW Written in Commercial Long Tail Lines 19.25% 24.82% 29.00% 35.34% 2.857
Percent of P&C DPW in Products Liabiilty 1.35% 6.06% 0.60% 3.58% 2.027
Percent of Premiums Ceded to Reinsurers 13.42% 15.68% 14.27% 21.38% 0.422 31.55% 23.81% 36.82% 28.33% 1.912
Duration Gap  6.8881 3.2654 4.9307 4.4235 4.689 6.379 3.470 4.916 4.101 3.665
Ratio of Preferred Capital Stock + Surplus Notes to Total Assets 0.0052 0.0232 0.0158 0.1129 1.022 0.012 0.041 0.011 0.055 0.144
Capital to Asset Ratio 0.1088 0.0908 0.3343 0.2663 9.182 0.337 0.143 0.420 0.208 4.114
Dummy Variable = 1 if the RBC Ratio is Binding 0.0252 0.1574 0.1051 0.3068 2.800
Policyholder Surplus to Risk Based Capital 9.022 9.150 14.141 20.385 2.627
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Current Year 0.1176 0.3236 0.2700 0.4442 3.638 0.270 0.446 0.340 0.474 1.503
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Previous Year 0.0588 0.2363 0.1889 0.3916 3.554 0.144 0.353 0.209 0.406 1.628
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Prior 2 Years 0.1681 0.3755 0.2184 0.4134 1.273 0.234 0.425 0.247 0.431 0.293
Incurred Tax Rate < Alternative Minimum Tax Rate Dummy 0.2269 0.4206 0.2765 0.4475 1.155 0.360 0.482 0.243 0.429 2.767
Mutual Organizational Form Dummy Variable 0.1513 0.3598 0.0673 0.2506 3.301 0.234 0.425 0.214 0.410 0.506
"Pure" Stock Organizational Form Dummy Variable 0.7059 0.4576 0.5991 0.4903 2.270 0.622 0.487 0.540 0.499 1.664
Single Unaffliated Company Dummy  0.0924 0.2909 0.2553 0.4362 3.977 0.189 0.393 0.275 0.447 1.969
Direct Writer Dummy Variable 0.0588 0.2363 0.0618 0.2408 0.126 0.279 0.451 0.188 0.391 2.351
Broker Dummy Variable 0.1176 0.3236 0.0802 0.2717 1.399 0.072 0.260 0.091 0.288 0.688
Affliated Member Active in Derivatives Dummy Variable 0.6218 0.4870 0.0774 0.2674 19.020 0.550 0.500 0.109 0.312 13.699
Note - 1085 Life Non-Users, 119 Life Users;  1553 P&C Non-Users, 111 P&C UsersTable 3
Derivatives Use By Insurers
Notional Amounts for Positions Opened During 1994
Life/Health Insurers, By Type of Risk




of Users Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Total
Part A Transactions - Call, Put, Cap and Floor Agreements Purchased
Bonds 26 503,810          168,200          948,490          50                   4,611,100       13,099,100    
Commodities 1 4,460              4,460              - 4,460              4,460              4,460             
Equities 18 130,120          7,830              407,990          0                     1,739,320       2,342,300      
Foreign Currency 3 133,240          54,840            140,010          50,000            294,890          399,730         
Interest Rates 23 895,490          305,000          1,653,330       1,200              6,500,000       20,596,290    
Part B Transactions - Call, Put, Cap and Floor Agreements Written
Bonds 20 528,960          287,150          592,000          10,000            2,000,000       10,579,340    
Equities 32 52,290            3,810              204,880          0                     1,160,950       1,673,560      
Foreign Currency 3 104,780          25,000            150,910          10,500            278,840          314,340         
Interest Rates 4 656,000          325,000          843,480          94,000            1,880,010       2,624,010      
Part C Transactions - Collar, Swap and Forward Aggreements
Bonds 2 89,250            89,250            126,200          10                   178,500          178,510         
Commodities 5 12,260            10,140            15,750            810                 39,200            61,300           
Equities 3 78,820            75,000            20,990            60,000            101,460          236,460         
Foreign Currency 23 1,196,550       80,410            3,598,130       10                   16,190,170     27,520,690    
Mortgages 2 42,470            42,470            24,360            25,250            59,700            84,950           
Interest Rates 57 469,380          162,290          1,166,020       0                     8,565,720       26,754,770    
Part D Transactions - Futures Contracts
Bonds 53 1,170,990       212,140          3,467,420       50                   24,089,410     62,062,810    
Equities 7 73,140            96,610            70,150            1,030              193,090          512,010         
Foreign Currency 3 1,351,240       982,090          1,480,880       89,860            2,981,790       4,053,740      
Interest Rates 5 6,865,290       50,650            14,162,470     11,960            32,150,780     34,326,470    
Notional Amounts for Contracts Opened During 1994
Property/Casualty Insurers, By Type of Risk




of Users Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Total
Part A Transactions - Call, Put, Cap and Floor Agreements Purchased
Bonds 4 124,110          10,600            233,990          240                 475,000          496,440         
Equities 39 57,870            5,910              100,430          30                   423,610          2,257,230      
Foreign Currency 2 73,330            73,330            13,030            64,120            82,550            146,670         
Interest Rates 1 212,780          212,780          212,780          212,780          212,780         
Part B Transactions - Call, Put, Cap and Floor Agreements Written
Bonds 11 54,580            16,900            90,460            1,000              274,000          600,380         
Equities 74 132,400          8,970              755,620          0                     6,484,850       9,797,750      
Foreign Currency 2 1,857,350       1,857,350       1,005,140       1,146,600       2,568,100       3,714,700      
Part C Transactions - Collar, Swap and Forward Aggreements
Equities 3 87,230            94,240            69,610            14,380            153,080          261,710         
Foreign Currency 23 345,120          106,030          536,120          280                 2,149,410       7,937,830      
Interest Rates 7 44,510            15,250            50,770            7,800              150,000          311,580         
Part D Transactions - Futures Contracts
Bonds 11 311,110          165,630          312,590          10,180            829,610          3,422,220      
Equities 14 282,670          114,100          544,240          620                 2,139,240       3,957,480      
Foreign Currency 4 84,930            40,510            110,420          9,600              249,100          339,730         
Interest Rates 4 486,340          473,310          461,960          7,760              990,980          1,945,380      
Note - Total notional amount for equity call/put options calculated as No. of Contracts * 100 * Strike Price
        - Total notional amount for bond call/put options calculated as par value of underlying bonds
        - Total notional amount reported for futures contract calculated as no. of contracts * futures payoff * strike priceTable 4
Cragg and Tobit Regression Results:  Life/Health Insurers
       OLS        OLS
Variable       Tobit      Probit  Log(Notional)       Tobit      Probit  Log(Notional)
Intercept -145.433 *** -9.218 *** -3.753 -143.487 *** -9.100 *** -3.533
(6.994) (6.899) -(0.918) (7.067) (7.003) -(0.895)
Log(Total Assets) 5.433 *** 0.336 *** 1.167 *** 5.361 *** 0.332 *** 1.142 ***
(6.097) (5.712) (6.623) (6.162) (5.792) (6.765)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Stocks 40.623 *** 2.546 *** -2.856 40.209 *** 2.524 *** -2.766
(2.954) (2.782) -(0.859) (2.932) (2.763) -(0.841)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Real Estate -8.609 -0.212 -6.435 ** -8.590 -0.219 -6.326 **
(0.600) (0.225) -(2.052) (0.604) (0.236) -(2.036)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Publicly Traded CMO's -1.155 -0.081 -8.243 *** -0.708 -0.054 -7.918 ***
(0.124) (0.134) -(3.629) (0.076) (0.089) -(3.589)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Privately Placed Commercial Bonds 37.839 ** 2.442 ** -7.740 ** 37.592 ** 2.421 ** -8.015 **
(2.250) (2.228) -(2.085) (2.283) (2.265) -(2.210)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Privately Placed CMO's 503.895 *** 36.399 *** 28.251 507.446 *** 36.585 *** 27.282
(3.209) (3.079) (1.166) (3.232) (3.094) (1.138)
Foreign Denominated Liabilities Dummy Variable -0.444 -0.008 -0.137 -0.355 -0.004 -0.120
(0.113) (0.030) -(0.155) (0.090) (0.015) -(0.137)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Non-US and Non-Canadian Bonds 26.495 1.819 -3.173 26.718 1.850 -2.665
(1.361) (1.208) -(1.100) (1.380) (1.230) -(0.956)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Non-US and Non-Canadian Stocks 157.343 *** 9.568 ** -4.979 155.364 *** 9.437 ** -3.670
(2.657) (2.501) -(0.328) (2.630) (2.478) -(0.245)
(Foreign Bonds and Stocks) x Foreign Liabilities Interaction Term -92.597 -5.734 9.567 -93.161 -5.757 8.561
(1.347) (1.391) (0.330) (1.351) (1.400) (0.299)
Percent of LH Reserves in Individual Life and Annuity Reserves 9.953 ** 0.641 ** 1.163 9.756 ** 0.635 ** 1.251
(2.176) (2.100) (1.161) (2.158) (2.104) (1.276)
Percent of Life/Health Reserves in Group Annuities 13.819 0.869 0.936 14.215 0.899 1.016
(1.298) (1.241) (0.437) (1.335) (1.290) (0.479)
Percent of LH Reserves in Guaranteed Investment Contracts 22.480 * 2.169 ** 7.219 *** 22.320 * 2.181 ** 7.246 ***
(1.859) (2.037) (3.711) (1.846) (2.048) (3.763)
Percent of LH Premiums Due to Dividends Used to Purchase Paid-up Additions -6.893 * -0.434 0.396 -7.078 * -0.441 0.450
(1.645) (1.536) (0.525) (1.694) (1.563) (0.605)
Percent of Premiums Ceded to Reinsurers 3.479 0.181 -0.322 - - -
(0.521) (0.408) -(0.217)
Duration Gap  0.348 0.025 -0.213 *** 0.338 0.024 -0.211 ***
(1.040) (1.112) -(2.936) (1.015) (1.093) -(2.954)
Ratio of Preferred Capital Stock + Surplus Notes to Total Assets -24.644 -2.082 3.664 -24.185 -2.062 3.177
(0.732) (0.890) (0.388) (0.726) (0.888) (0.344)
Capital to Asset Ratio -34.045 ** -1.981 * 7.930 * -33.956 ** -1.972 * 7.796 *
(2.134) (1.866) (1.800) (2.133) (1.860) (1.784)
Dummy Variable = 1 if the RBC Ratio is Binding -12.863 * -0.863 * 1.201 -12.521 * -0.837 * 1.273
(1.734) (1.684) (0.843) (1.712) (1.658) (0.905)
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Current Year 0.361 0.085 0.780 0.161 0.075 0.792
(0.094) (0.326) (0.980) (0.042) (0.288) (1.020)
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Previous Year -2.191 -0.102 -1.222 -2.049 -0.095 -1.242
(0.543) (0.396) -(1.150) (0.509) (0.369) -(1.185)
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Prior 2 Years 6.022 * 0.346 -0.662 6.279 ** 0.360 * -0.630
(1.876) (1.630) -(1.023) (1.980) (1.720) -(1.001)
Incurred Tax Rate < Alternative Minimum Tax Rate Dummy 6.196 ** 0.459 ** 0.830 6.320 ** 0.465 ** 0.848
(2.132) (2.326) (1.463) (2.188) (2.374) (1.523)
Mutual Organizational Form Dummy Variable -0.188 -0.027 -0.485 - - -
(0.052) (0.106) -(0.741)
Single Unaffliated Company Dummy  5.644 0.398 * -1.279 5.480 0.387 * -1.174
(1.592) (1.719) -(1.521) (1.561) (1.694) -(1.425)
Broker Dummy Variable 9.868 *** 0.695 *** -0.860 9.959 *** 0.702 *** -0.829
(2.641) (2.808) -(1.231) (2.684) (2.865) -(1.202)
Affliated Member Active in Derivatives Dummy Variable 21.667 *** 1.429 *** -1.220 ** 21.858 *** 1.440 *** -1.082 **
(7.474) (7.877) -(2.175) (7.756) (8.214) -(2.116)
Log Likelihood Function -630.175 -182.501 -630.309 -182.586
Adjusted R-Squared 42.6% 43.4%
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics shown in parantheses
        *Signficant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.                                                                                  Table 5
                          Cragg and Tobit Regression Results:  Property/Casualty Insurers
       OLS
Variable       Tobit      Probit  Log(Notional)
Intercept -147.830 *** -7.189 *** -2.271
(6.625) (7.114) -(0.575)
Log(Total Assets) 5.524 *** 0.265 *** 1.022 ***
(5.354) (5.362) (5.190)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Stocks 43.586 *** 2.213 *** 1.108
(4.368) (4.510) (0.577)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in Real Estate 121.293 *** 6.141 *** -9.457
(4.172) (4.439) -(1.509)
Percent of Asset Portfolio in CMO's 20.381 1.029 -2.074
(1.359) (1.369) -(0.728)
Foreign Denominated Liabilities Dummy Variable 18.119 *** 0.916 *** -2.229 **
(3.071) (3.061) -(2.387)
Foreign Asset Dummy Variable 11.054 *** 0.546 *** -0.752
(3.718) (3.760) -(1.408)
Foreign Assets Dummy Variable x Foreign Liabilities Interaction Term -17.476 ** -0.800 ** 1.351
(2.412) (2.107) (1.271)
Percent of P&C DPW Written in Commercial Long Tail Lines -8.486 * -0.401 * -0.726
(1.781) (1.675) -(0.753)
Percent of P&C DPW in Products Liabiilty 54.272 *** 2.565 *** -1.832
(2.684) (2.594) -(0.456)
Percent of Premiums Ceded to Reinsurers -10.937 ** -0.569 ** 0.993
(1.986) (2.028) (1.013)
Duration Gap  0.259 0.013 -0.010
(0.732) (0.717) -(0.140)
Ratio of Preferred Capital Stock + Surplus Notes to Total Assets 43.044 * 2.274 * -7.438
(1.741) (1.890) -(1.434)
Capital to Asset Ratio -23.084 ** -1.110 * -1.216
(1.972) (1.896) -(0.425)
Policyholder Surplus to Risk Based Capital 0.165 * 0.008 * -0.019
(1.666) (1.674) -(0.466)
No Federal Taxes Incurred Dummy, Current Year -6.320 * -0.288 * -0.320
(1.945) (1.747) -(0.574)
Incurred Tax Rate < Alternative Minimum Tax Rate Dummy -1.559 -0.077 0.127
(0.530) (0.512) (0.251)
Mutual Organizational Form Dummy Variable -0.647 -0.042 0.510
(0.208) (0.263) (0.986)
Single Unaffliated Company Dummy  17.218 *** 0.864 *** -0.222
(4.486) (4.645) -(0.314)
Broker Dummy Variable -4.173 -0.263 1.852 *
(0.921) (1.143) (1.911)
Affliated Member Active in Derivatives Dummy Variable 23.369 *** 1.199 *** 0.444
(6.837) (7.484) (0.818)
Log Likelihood Function -657.648 -245.114
Adjusted R-Squared 43.4%
Note: Absolute values of t-statistics shown in parantheses
        *Signficant at the 10% level; **Significant at the 5% level; ***Significant at the 1% level.